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Retrospective · Technology

The Iberian blackout: how a voltage surge shut down Spain and Portugal

On 28 April 2025 the grids of Spain and Portugal collapsed within seconds. Investigators found a cascade of overvoltage disconnections and failing voltage control, not a cyberattack. As of November 2026, the grid operator and the utilities still blame each other, and Spain's regulator has opened sanctioning proceedings.

RetrospectiveEvents of 28 April 2025. Published by Triple Frontiers on 18 November 2026 as part of our archive covering events before our launch, based on the sources listed below.
Red-and-white electricity pylons carrying power lines across green fields under a grey sky
High-voltage power lines in San Sebastián de los Reyes, near Madrid (file photo, 2026).Photo: MaGrc / Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 4.0)

At 12:33 Central European Summer Time on 28 April 2025, the electricity systems of continental Spain and continental Portugal collapsed 12. A small area of France near the Spanish border was briefly disrupted; the rest of the European grid saw no significant disturbance 12. Early official figures reported at the time said Spain lost 15 gigawatts of generation in about five seconds, equal to about 60% of national demand 34.

The European grid operators’ association, ENTSO-E, later called it the most severe blackout on the European power system in more than 20 years 12. “The 28 April 2025 blackout was a first of its kind event,” it said: the first in which a cascade of generator disconnections and rising voltage formed part of the sequence 25.

A day without power

Flights were grounded and train systems stopped; emergency workers rescued about 35,000 passengers from trains 34. The Lisbon and Porto metros closed, traffic lights failed in Portugal and Madrid, and hospitals in Madrid and Catalonia suspended routine work while running on backup generators 3. “This is something that has never happened before,” Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, said (translated from Spanish) 3.

The news agency EFE reported that at least five deaths in Spain were possibly linked to the outage, and that police were investigating the links 6. According to the Galician emergency service, three members of one family in Taboadela, Ourense, were found dead with a high concentration of carbon monoxide in their home, where a generator had been used for an oxygen machine 63. Spanish media reported that a woman in Alzira, Valencia, died after her electric oxygen machine stopped, and police sources told EFE that a fire which killed a woman in Madrid may have been started by a candle 6.

Both grid operators activated their restoration plans immediately 1. In Portugal, the grid operator REN had energised 85 of its 89 substations and switching stations by 22:00 7. The transmission grid was fully restored in Portugal at 00:22 on 29 April and in Spain at about 04:00 1. Red Eléctrica, Spain’s grid operator, said 99.95% of demand had been restored by 07:00 8.

Twelve seconds

ENTSO-E’s expert panel, 49 specialists led by experts from the Austrian and Hungarian grid operators, published its final report on 20 March 2026 15. It found that the incident began at 12:32:00 1. In the preceding half-hour, two episodes of oscillation, or power swings, had passed through the grid; the measures control rooms used to damp them, such as reducing exports to France, also raised voltage in the Iberian system 1.

From 12:32:57, generation began to trip in southern and western Spain: a transformer near Granada carrying 355 megawatts, then about 727 megawatts of solar plants near Badajoz, then about 928 megawatts across several provinces 1. With earlier losses, the total exceeded 2.5 gigawatts 19. No generation tripped in Portugal or France in that period 1. As units that had been absorbing reactive power dropped off, voltage rose further and set off a cascade of further disconnections 1. At 12:33:19 Spain and Portugal began losing synchronism with the rest of Europe; the lines to France were disconnected two seconds later, and automatic load shedding could not prevent the collapse 1.

The panel found no single cause. “The analyses above clearly indicate that the key phenomenon in the incident was the non-effectiveness of voltage control within the Spanish power system,” it wrote 1. Contributing factors included shunt reactors (devices that absorb excess voltage) being switched by hand, renewable plants operating at a fixed power factor under the rules then in force, several conventional plants falling short of their reactive-power reference, and protection settings at some generators set below required limits 19. The panel stressed that its mandate does not cover determining liability 1. Some data remained missing, which prevented it from identifying the cause of several generator trips 1. It made 21 recommendations 1.

How it unfolded

  1. Key moment. Spain and Portugal lose power.

  2. Transmission grids restored in Portugal (00:22) and Spain (about 04:00).

  3. Key moment. Spanish government report blames overvoltage and planning.

  4. Red Eléctrica’s report blames generators.

  5. Congress rejects the first grid decree; Portugal announces 31 measures.

  6. ENTSO-E factual report published.

  7. Spain approves grid resilience decree.

  8. Court closes sabotage inquiry.

  9. Key moment. ENTSO-E final report published.

  10. Key moment. CNMC opens sanctioning proceedings.

  11. CNMC approves new voltage-control rules.

Who was to blame

Spain’s government published its own findings first 1011. On 17 June 2025 Sara Aagesen, the ecological transition minister, presented a government committee report attributing the blackout to overvoltage and a chain reaction of disconnections 10111. “All of this happened in 12 seconds, with most of the power loss happening in just five seconds,” she said (translated from Spanish) 10. She said Red Eléctrica had not scheduled enough generation the day before to control an overvoltage episode, and that some plants disconnected improperly 1011. “There is no evidence of a cyberattack,” she said (translated from Spanish) 11.

Red Eléctrica rejected that account. Its own report, published a day later, blamed “a series of cumulative circumstances that far exceeded the N-1 safety criterion” and said generators obliged to provide dynamic voltage control had not complied 1213. The utilities’ association, Aelec, in turn blamed “poor management” by Red Eléctrica (translated) 14. After the ENTSO-E report, Red Eléctrica said it showed no cause attributable to the operator 15. “Red Eléctrica did not fail,” Beatriz Corredor, chair of its parent company Redeia, told shareholders in May 2026 16.

A criminal inquiry into possible sabotage was closed on 12 January 2026 17. Judge José Luis Calama of the Audiencia Nacional found no “mínimo indicio” (minimum indication) of terrorist sabotage, and the national cybersecurity institute, INCIBE, detected no harmful cyber activity 17.

Reforms

The government’s first package of grid measures, which included paying renewable plants to help control voltage, was rejected by the Congress of Deputies in July 2025 by 183 votes to 165 1819. In November 2025 the government approved a royal decree that revived some of those measures, including oversight of voltage-control obligations and a target of 22.5 gigawatts of energy storage by 2030 20. Portugal announced 31 measures costing €400 million, including doubling its black-start power plants, which can restart a dead grid, from two to four 21.

Spain’s energy regulator, the CNMC, said in March 2026 that the system had had the regulatory tools it needed at the time of the incident, while recommending further measures 22. In July 2026 it approved further changes to voltage-control rules to draw in more renewable plants 23. Redeia said in May 2026 that 14.5 gigawatts, including 6 gigawatts of renewables, were providing voltage control, and that its “reinforced scheduling” of the system had cost €711 million to the end of April 2026; it said it aimed to end the practice 16.

Where things stand

In April 2026 the CNMC opened sanctioning proceedings over indications of non-compliance, some sustained over long periods 2425. According to the Catalan newspaper Ara, they include a possible very serious infringement by Red Eléctrica and 19 cases against plants of companies including Endesa, Naturgy, Iberdrola and Repsol 26. The regulator said the proceedings do not by themselves attribute the cause of the blackout to the companies concerned, and that they can last up to 18 months 2425. In Portugal, the regulator ERSE classified the blackout in May 2026 as an exceptional event originating in Spain 27.

Why it matters

The Iberian blackout was not caused by an attack, and the expert panel did not blame any single plant or technology 117. It found that voltage control in Spain’s grid was not effective on the day 1. ENTSO-E said the event showed how local developments can have system-wide implications 5. The reforms since have focused on making every kind of plant help hold voltage steady, and the regulator’s sanctioning proceedings, opened in April 2026, can take 9 to 18 months 242623.

Sources and references

  1. ReportENTSO-E Expert Panel, “Grid Incident in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 2025 – Final Report”, 20 March 2026. Link
  2. ReportENTSO-E, “28 April 2025 Blackout”, 20 March 2026. Link
  3. ArticleRTÉ, “Spain power outage (live report, 29 April 2025)”, 29 April 2025. Link
  4. ArticleAssociated Press (via Yahoo News), “Power returns to Spain and Portugal. The outage’s cause remains a mystery”, 29 April 2025. Link
  5. ReportENTSO-E, “ENTSO-E Publishes Expert Panel Final Report on 28 April 2025 Blackout in Spain and Portugal”, 20 March 2026. Link
  6. ArticleEFE (via Primicias), “Al menos cinco muertes en España tienen posible vínculo con el gran apagón eléctrico”, 29 April 2025. Link
  7. Official documentREN – Redes Energéticas Nacionais, “Only 4 substations to be connected at 10:00 p.m.”, 28 April 2025. Link
  8. Official documentRed Eléctrica, “Red Eléctrica’s response to the incident of 28 April”, 28 April 2025. Link
  9. Articlepv magazine, “Entso-E report finds systemic failures behind 2025 Iberian blackout”, 23 March 2026. Link
  10. ArticleAssociated Press (via NBC News), “Spain says April blackout was caused by grid failures and poor planning, not a cyberattack”, 18 June 2025. Link
  11. Articlepv magazine, “Overvoltage, chain reaction, improper disconnections behind Spain’s blackout”, 18 June 2025. Link
  12. Official documentRed Eléctrica, “Red Eléctrica presents its report on the incident of 28 April and proposes recommendations”, 18 June 2025. Link
  13. Articlepv magazine, “Spanish grid operator claims power outage originated from solar plant”, 18 June 2025. Link
  14. ArticleAra (English edition), “The power companies attribute the blackout to poor management by Red Eléctrica”, 23 June 2025. Link
  15. Official documentRed Eléctrica, “Red Eléctrica no falló: el informe del ‘Expert panel’ europeo confirma las causas del incidente identificadas por el OS”, 20 March 2026. Link
  16. Official documentRedeia, “Red Eléctrica unveils a new suite of measures to further strengthen the Spanish electricity system”, 13 May 2026. Link
  17. ArticleLegal Today (Europa Press), “La AN archiva la investigación sobre el apagón al no existir un mínimo indicio de sabotaje terrorista”, 12 January 2026. Link
  18. ArticlePV Tech, “Spanish Congress rejects blackout grid reform decree”, 24 July 2025. Link
  19. Articlepv magazine, “Spanish parliament rejects grid reform law proposed after April blackout”, 23 July 2025. Link
  20. ArticlePV Tech, “Spain passes decree strengthening grid resilience and boosting energy storage”, 5 November 2025. Link
  21. ArticleESS News, “Portugal to hold energy storage auction before January 2026”, 29 July 2025. Link
  22. Official documentCNMC, “La CNMC aprueba el informe de recomendaciones y propuestas sobre el incidente del 28 de abril de 2025”, 19 March 2026. Link
  23. Official documentCNMC, “La CNMC aprueba modificar dos procedimientos de operación para incentivar que las renovables participen en el control de tensión”, 10 July 2026. Link
  24. Official documentCNMC, “La CNMC incoa expedientes sancionadores por indicios de infracción en el marco de las investigaciónes del incidente eléctrico del 28 de abril de 2025”, 17 April 2026. Link
  25. Official documentCNMC, “La CNMC continúa el proceso de incoaciones en el marco de las investigaciónes del incidente eléctrico del 28 de abril de 2025”, 24 April 2026. Link
  26. ArticleAra, “Competencia señala a Red Eléctrica por su papel durante el apagón y abre 19 expedientes contra plantas energeticas”, 17 April 2026. Link
  27. Official documentREN – Redes Energéticas Nacionais, “ERSE classifica apagão ibérico de 28 de abril de 2025 como evento excecional”, 26 May 2026. Link

Sources and references are provided for transparency and further reading. Allegations and claims are attributed to their respective sources. Triple Frontiers distinguishes reported allegations from independently established facts.

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The Iberian blackout: how a voltage surge shut down Spain and Portugal

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Technology, security and the digital economy. Stories are researched from official records, court documents, institutional reports and published journalism, with the help of AI research tools, and edited for Triple Frontiers. Every factual claim is linked to its source.

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