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Investigation · Politics

New provinces for Pakistan? The push, the constitutional lock and the evidence

Since July 2026 ministers and allies have pressed for new provinces, and a prime ministerial aide says a 28th amendment will come before the New Year. The PPP and the Sindh Assembly reject any division of Sindh, and the Constitution requires a two-thirds vote of the affected province. This investigation weighs the evidence and sets out how reform could be done.

By Investigations Desk · Published 18 Nov 2026 · 26 min read · 6 source documents

Photo: Usman Ghani / Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Key findings

  1. As of 1 November 2026, a prime ministerial aide said a 28th amendment would be introduced before the New Year; as of 14 November, ARY reported, citing unnamed sources, that referendum groundwork had been accelerated. Confirmed
  2. Article 239(4) bars any change to a province’s limits without a two-thirds vote of that provincial assembly; Sindh’s assembly resolved on 3 September 2026 that Sindh ‘shall remain one’. Confirmed
  3. Punjab holds about 53 per cent of Pakistan’s 241.49 million people, and 82 per cent of provincial transfers are distributed by population under an NFC award extended for nearly 15 years. Confirmed
  4. A 2026 task force found no province had implemented Article 140-A consistently; local governments’ share of national spending fell from about 10 per cent in 2005 to under 5 per cent in 2024. Confirmed
  5. World Bank data show faster average growth in military periods (about 6.2 per cent) than civilian ones (about 3.8 per cent), but analysts link much of it to geopolitically driven US aid; elected local government has repeatedly been created by military regimes and dismantled by their civilian successors. Disputed
  6. Pakistan ranks 168th of 193 on UNDP’s HDI, with GDP per capita about $1,596 in 2025 against about $2,600-2,700 in India and Bangladesh, and is in its 24th IMF programme since 1958. Confirmed
  7. Evidence from India’s 2000 state reorganisation is mixed: Uttarakhand grew strongly, Jharkhand showed no significant change. Confirmed

Confirmedbacked by documents or on-record sourcesAllegedclaimed by sources, not provenDisputedcontested by the parties involved

On 1 November 2026 Huzaifa Rehman, a special assistant to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, said a 28th constitutional amendment would be introduced before the New Year, and said: “If new provinces are not created through the 28th Constitutional Amendment, they will never be created.” 1 He said the draft had made significant progress but that some details were still unsettled, and that the timeline could slip by a week or ten days 1. Four days earlier Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), a federal ally, had called for the debate to be closed: “So we should now put a full stop to this conversation as well.” 2

The exchange captures where Pakistan’s argument over new provinces stands. As of 14 November 2026, ARY News reported, citing unnamed parliamentary sources, that the government had accelerated preparations for a referendum on new provinces under Article 48(6) of the Constitution, possibly before Senate elections expected in early March 2027 3. The reported plan would create 10 to 12 provinces: four in Punjab and two each in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan 3. A separate version, attributed by Daily Pakistan to the journalist Ansar Abbasi, gives three each to KP and Balochistan 4. As of 8 November 2026, according to Daily Pakistan, the plan was still under discussion, with capitals and boundaries not finalised 4.

This investigation sets out what is being proposed, the constitutional route, the history of earlier attempts, what the data show about the present system, what evidence exists on whether more provinces help, and the costs and risks. It ends with Triple Frontiers’ own assessment of how reform should be done.

What is being proposed

The current round began on 30 July 2026, when Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi told the Pakistan Economic Summit: “This system, in which we are living, has collapsed, whether you believe it or not.” 5 He added: “Administrative units, provinces, whatever name you give it, it will have to be taken to the level of the people.” 5 Arab News reported that it was unclear whether he was giving a personal view or signalling government thinking 5. According to The News, the military’s spokesman, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, backed a serious debate the next day, citing a fourfold increase in population 6.

Two coalition partners endorsed the idea within days. Mustafa Kamal of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P), the federal health minister, said: “This is not just our wish now. It has become a compulsion for this country, for this state to run.” 7 Abdul Aleem Khan, president of the Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party (IPP), wrote that each province should eventually be divided into three administrative regions 7. On 15 August he backed a Hazara province in KP and South Punjab and Bahawalpur provinces, and said there would be “no harm in dividing each of the four provinces into four or more administrative units” 8.

On 15 August Dawn reported, citing an unnamed senior government functionary, that the options under discussion included Karachi and Gwadar coming under federal administrative control, Balochistan split in two, Punjab in three and KP divided into Pakhtun and Hazara regions 9. The same official described strengthening local government, with funds channelled directly from the federal government, as an alternative 9. Media estimates of the number of new provinces ranged from 7 to 27, Dawn reported on 10 August 10.

A detailed proposal from inside the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) came from Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal on 4 September: “I would say we need 12-15 new provinces.” 6 He asked the prime minister to form a committee on administrative reforms and warned: “If you want to create new provinces it has to be based on some equitable formula” 6. A prime ministerial coordinator, Rana Ihsaan Afzal Khan, said then that no committee or formal federal process existed and that any new provinces would come in the next election cycle 6.

The party’s official line is less settled. On 12 September Rana Sanaullah, the prime minister’s adviser on political affairs, said: “The matter of new provinces has not yet been brought before the cabinet.” 11 He said parliament would decide and that the PML-N would issue a formal policy statement when the matter reached parliament 11. He also said a government could not hold a referendum on its own decision, and cited Article 48(6), which requires a referendum proposal to be approved at a joint sitting of parliament 12.

How a province is made: the constitutional route

Creating a province requires a constitutional amendment under Article 239 1314. An amendment bill must be passed by two-thirds of the total membership of each house of parliament 14. Clause (4) adds a further lock: “A Bill to amend the Constitution which would have the effect of altering the limits of a Province shall not be presented to the President for assent unless it has been passed by the Provincial Assembly of that Province by the votes of not less than two-thirds of its total membership.” 14

Dawn reported on 10 August 2026 that speculation suggested the government might amend the Constitution to bypass Article 239(4), and that legal experts estimated as many as 12 articles might need amending 10. Any change would itself need a two-thirds majority in parliament 10. Daily Pakistan noted that new provinces need parliamentary approval and could not be created by referendum alone 4. The PPP’s Nayyar Bukhari argued: “A referendum is held on matters on which the Constitution is silent.” 10

The 27th Amendment showed in November 2025 that the government can assemble two-thirds majorities 15. The 27th Amendment, which created a Federal Constitutional Court and amended Article 243 on the army’s command structure, passed the Senate 64 to 4 and received presidential assent in November 2025 15. Dawn’s account of its contents centred on the courts and the army 15. MQM-P said after its passage that its proposal on local government would be advanced as part of a 28th amendment 13.

A history of attempts

On 9 May 2012 the Punjab Assembly unanimously passed two resolutions, one calling for a South Punjab province and one for restoring Bahawalpur province; both were moved by the PML-N’s Rana Sanaullah, then Punjab law minister 16. A parliamentary commission headed by the PPP’s Farhatullah Babar then recommended a “Bahawalpur Janoobi Punjab” province of the Bahawalpur, Multan and Dera Ghazi Khan divisions plus Bhakkar and Mianwali districts 17. It would have taken roughly a third of Punjab’s districts and seats, cut Punjab’s National Assembly seats from 183 to 124 and enlarged the Senate from 104 to 127 seats 17. The PML-N boycotted the commission 17. On 6 March 2013 the Senate passed the resulting 24th Amendment Bill with 70 votes and none against, as the PML-N walked out 18. The bill still needed the National Assembly and a two-thirds vote in the Punjab Assembly 1718.

The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) campaigned in 2018 on a South Punjab province; in office it found that this required a constitutional amendment with two-thirds majorities and turned to an administrative secretariat instead 19. In June 2020 the Punjab government approved 385 posts, including an additional chief secretary and an additional inspector-general, for a South Punjab secretariat covering the Multan, Bahawalpur and DG Khan divisions 19. In January 2019 the PML-N, then in opposition, submitted a bill to create Bahawalpur and South Punjab provinces, which also proposed a National Commission for the Creation of New Provinces 20.

The secretariat’s fate is disputed. PTI’s Amir Dogar said in August 2026 that the PML-N had shelved the South Punjab plan and dissolved the secretariat 10. A Geo News fact-check in July 2024 found that the secretariat had not been shut down, although several Lahore-based secretaries had been given additional charge of southern departments 21. Punjab’s information minister, Azma Bokhari, said then: “No, the South Punjab secretariat is functional.” 21

In KP, the assembly adopted a PTI resolution for a Hazara province by majority vote on 21 March 2014, over opposition from the PPP, the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Qaumi Watan Party 22. The ANP’s Sardar Hussain Babak alleged it was based on linguistic divisions 22. A second resolution followed on 4 January 2022, and on 2 December 2025 the assembly passed a third, this time unanimously, asking the federal government to “initiate the constitutional process for the creation of Hazara province” 23.

A completed boundary change is the 2018 merger of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) into KP through the 25th Amendment 24. Parliament approved it with what Dawn called “rare political consensus”, the KP Assembly passed it on 28 May 2018 and the president signed it shortly before 1 June 24. The KP Assembly grew from 124 to 145 seats and the Senate was set to shrink from 104 to 96 as Fata’s senators retired 24. When the 11th National Finance Commission (NFC) first met on 4 December 2025, more than seven years later, all parties agreed to consider KP’s share in light of the merger of the former Fata and PATA areas, and a working group was set up to review it 25.

How it unfolded

  1. Key moment. Punjab Assembly unanimously backs South Punjab and Bahawalpur provinces.

  2. Senate passes 24th Amendment Bill for a Bahawalpur Janoobi Punjab province.

  3. KP Assembly passes first Hazara province resolution.

  4. Key moment. KP Assembly approves Fata merger under the 25th Amendment.

  5. PML-N submits bill for Bahawalpur and South Punjab provinces.

  6. PTI-led Punjab government approves South Punjab secretariat posts.

  7. Census results approved: 241.49 million people, 127.68 million in Punjab.

  8. 27th Amendment becomes law; MQM-P says it will pursue a 28th.

  9. KP Assembly unanimously backs Hazara province.

  10. Key moment. Interior Minister Naqvi says governance ‘has collapsed’, calls for new units.

  11. Key moment. Sindh Assembly resolves that Sindh ‘shall remain one’.

  12. Ahsan Iqbal proposes 12-15 new provinces.

  13. Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari calls for a ‘full stop’ to the debate.

  14. Key moment. PM’s aide says 28th amendment will come before New Year.

  15. ARY reports, citing sources, faster groundwork for a referendum.

What is wrong with the current system

The provinces differ greatly in size 26. The 2023 census, approved by the Council of Common Interests on 5 August 2023, counted 241.49 million people: 127.68 million in Punjab, 55.69 million in Sindh, 40.85 million in KP, 14.89 million in Balochistan and 2.36 million in Islamabad 26. On those figures Punjab holds about 53 per cent of the population and Balochistan about 6 per cent 26. The population grew 2.55 per cent a year between 2017 and 2023, up from 2.4 per cent in the previous census period 2627.

Federal transfers to the provinces are weighted heavily by population 28. Under the 7th NFC Award of 2009-10, the provinces’ share of the divisible pool rose from 47.5 per cent to 56 per cent and then to 57.5 per cent from 2011, and was distributed 82 per cent by population, 10.3 per cent by poverty, 5 per cent by revenue generation and 2.7 per cent by inverse population density 28. The award has been extended year by year for nearly 15 years, far beyond its five-year tenure, because the centre and provinces cannot agree on a new formula 28. The 18th Amendment bars any future award from giving a province less than its share in the previous award 28. Ahsan Iqbal has proposed freezing the population figure at 241.5 million and reducing its weight 28.

A task force on local governance, reporting in August 2026, found that no province had implemented Article 140-A, inserted by the 18th Amendment in 2010, consistently or in line with the Constitution 29. It found that local governments’ share of national spending fell from about 10 per cent in 2005 to under 5 per cent in 2024, and that of an estimated Rs9.2 trillion in federal transfers to the provinces in 2026-27 about Rs1.8 trillion was expected to reach local governments 29. It reported that Punjab has had no elected local tier since January 2022 29.

Local elections have repeatedly been delayed 3031. The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) said in July 2026 that changes to local government laws “at the eleventh hour made it impossible to hold polls on time” 31. On 6 November 2026 The Express Tribune reported that the ECP had suspended preparations for local polls in the remaining KP districts after a federal order extended the suspension of Article 140-A there, and had fixed 7 February 2027 for the first phase of Punjab’s local elections 30.

The World Bank estimated in September 2025 that poverty rose to 25.3 per cent in 2023-24 from 18.3 per cent in 2021-22, erasing two decades of gains, and that rural poverty is more than twice urban poverty 32. UNDP’s 2025 Human Development Report ranked Pakistan 168th of 193 countries, in the low human development category 33. The Girls Education Statistics and Trends Report 2023-24 estimated 25.37 million children aged 5 to 16 out of school, 9.6 million of them in Punjab and 7.82 million in Sindh 34.

Military rule, civilian rule and development: what the record shows

A common argument in Pakistan’s debate is that the country developed faster under military rule and that civilian governments have failed 35. The growth data partly support the first half of that claim. A Triple Frontiers calculation from World Bank data, which assigns years to each government approximately, gives average annual GDP growth of about 6.8 per cent in 1961-69 under Ayub Khan, 6.9 per cent in 1978-88 under Zia ul-Haq and 4.8 per cent in 2000-08 under Pervez Musharraf 36. Civilian periods averaged about 4.1 per cent in 1972-77, 4.1 per cent in 1989-99 and 3.5 per cent in 2009-25 36. Across all years, military periods averaged about 6.2 per cent and civilian periods about 3.8 per cent 36. The economist Ahmad Faruqui reached a similar conclusion, writing that growth under military rule was almost twice that under civilian rule 35.

Foreign aid complicates the comparison 3537. Faruqui argues that US aid helped growth under Ayub in the early 1960s and flowed heavily to Zia after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and that aid driven by geopolitics weakens the case that military rule itself produced the growth 35. The Center for Global Development found that US aid to Pakistan rose and fell with US strategic interests, that the United States halted aid entirely in several periods including the 1990s, and that it obligated nearly $67 billion in constant 2011 dollars between 1951 and 2011 37. On that account, much of the 1990s civilian decade ran without US aid 37. Faruqui also notes that civilian governments often operated “under the gaze of the military”, and that Musharraf’s growth fell to 1.7 per cent in his final year 35.

Major infrastructure has been built under both kinds of government 3839. Tarbela Dam, built under the Indus Waters Treaty signed in 1960 under the aegis of the World Bank, was contracted in 1968 and completed in 1976 38. The 339-kilometre Islamabad-Lahore M-2 motorway was inaugurated on 26 November 1997 by the then prime minister, Nawaz Sharif 39. Analysts also find structural weaknesses that cut across regime type: the economist Yousuf Nazar, citing work by Atif Mian, argues that Pakistan’s exports lagged its South Asian rivals under both democratic and military governments, in repeated cycles of import-led boom, balance-of-payments crisis and IMF rescue 40.

This history matters for the provinces debate because elected local government in Pakistan has repeatedly been created by military regimes 41. Ali Cheema, Adnan Khan and Roger Myerson wrote in 2010 that “three times in the history of Pakistan, elected institutions of local democracy have been created by military regimes”, under Ayub’s Basic Democracies in 1959, Zia in 1979 and Musharraf in 2001 41. Each time, they found, subsequent civilian governments either failed to revive elected councils or replaced them with unelected administrators 41. They argue that military regimes used local councils “to legitimize and strengthen their control over the state”, excluded political parties from sponsoring candidates, and that parties came to see non-partisan local government as an instrument of military rule 41. Their conclusion is that a durable system must give the mainstream parties a stake in local democracy, for example by electing councils from party lists 41.

A nuclear power with low living standards: how did it happen

Pakistan’s GDP per capita was about $1,596 in 2025, against about $2,702 for India and $2,597 for Bangladesh, according to World Bank data 42. Investment is low: gross capital formation was about 14.3 per cent of GDP in 2025, against 34.6 per cent in India and 28.5 per cent in Bangladesh 43. In September 2024 the IMF approved a $7 billion, three-year programme, Pakistan’s 24th since 1958 4445. The IMF said then that “Pakistan’s vulnerabilities and structural challenges remain formidable” and the loan came with commitments to broaden what AFP called a “chronically low tax base” 44. The programme targets a three-percentage-point rise in net tax-to-GDP 45.

IQAir’s 2025 data ranked Pakistan the smoggiest country in the world, with concentrations of fine particulate matter up to 13 times the World Health Organization guideline, Reuters reported 46. UNDP’s 2020 National Human Development Report estimated that economic privileges for elite groups, including the corporate sector, feudal landowners, the political class and the military establishment, cost about Rs2,660 billion, or $17.4 billion, roughly 7 per cent of GDP in 2017-18 4748. It found that the richest 1 per cent held about 9 per cent of national income in 2018-19 47.

Analysts attribute the gap to several causes 324940. The World Bank’s Christina Wieser said in 2025 that the “growth model that supported initial poverty reduction has proven insufficient to sustain progress” 32. UNDP’s report argued that “powerful groups use their privilege to capture more than their fair share” 48. Nazar points to chronically low savings and investment and calls the twin deficits “just symptoms of much wider and deeper issues” 40. The Institute of Policy Studies, an Islamabad think tank, writes that “the persistent failure has been one of implementation rather than constitutional design” 49. Population growth of 2.55 per cent a year, recorded by the 2023 census, adds to demand for services 26.

What the evidence says about more provinces

Supporters of new provinces often cite India 510. Naqvi said India grew from 14 states at independence to 29 5. The Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (Pildat) president, Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, proposed a State Reorganisation Commission on the model of India’s 1953 body: “Such a commission should also be formed in Pakistan.” 10

A 2022 study by Vikash Vaibhav and K. V. Ramaswamy of the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research examined the November 2000 creation of Uttarakhand, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh using synthetic control methods 50. It found “extraordinary” growth in Uttarakhand, faster but statistically insignificant growth in Chhattisgarh and Bihar, and no significant change in Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh or Uttar Pradesh 50. The authors concluded that smaller units “may not be a panacea” 50. Umair Javed of the Lahore University of Management Sciences told The News that research on smaller units is inconclusive, though they can bring power closer to people if accountability is strong 6.

The South Punjab secretariat was an attempt to bring administration closer to the south without creating a province, and within four years its powers were contested 1921. Dawn’s editorial board argued in August 2026 that the case for smaller provinces “rests on the flawed assumption that such an exercise will automatically bring the government closer to citizens” and proposed “constitutionally guaranteeing the continuity of local governments as the effective third tier of governance” 51. Former PML-N minister Khurram Dastgir Khan said: “The crisis of governance does not lie in the size of the administrative unit.” 7 The IPS paper, by contrast, says provinces with tens of millions of people “cannot be governed effectively from a single provincial capital”, but argues that restructuring “should complement, not substitute for, effective devolution” 49.

Costs and risks

New provinces would require elections, assemblies, high courts and bureaucracies at a time of strain from debt and successive IMF programmes, The News reported 6. Daily Pakistan reported that creating eight additional provinces could cost tens or hundreds of billions of rupees, without giving a detailed estimate 4. Dividing a province would also reopen water shares under the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord 6.

Representation in parliament would shift 617. The 2013 commission’s single new province alone would have added 23 Senate seats 17. Ahsan Iqbal acknowledged that a split province would gain Senate seats and that any redivision needs a formula to avoid skewing representation 6. Arab News noted that the PML-N and PPP draw much of their electoral strength from Punjab and Sindh 7.

Sindh’s opposition is the main political obstacle 252. On 3 September 2026 the Sindh Assembly unanimously passed, amid an opposition walkout, a resolution declaring that “Sindh is one and shall remain one” and citing Article 239(4) 52. Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah said: “As long as even one member among us is alive, the province will not be divided.” 52 Nationalist parties in Sindh held near-daily protests from 12 August, The News reported 6. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said on 7 September that any decision taken would have to be implemented despite the assembly’s position 53. JUI-F Senator Kamran Murtaza said the government appeared determined to create provinces “by hook or by crook” 10.

The Hazara debate shows how identity enters even administrative proposals: in 2014 the ANP alleged the resolution was based on linguistic divisions, while PTI members said it was about administrative convenience 22. The Pakistan Bar Council said any move must be handled “strictly within the framework of the Constitution” 9.

Triple Frontiers’ assessment: how it should be done

This section is Triple Frontiers’ analysis. It rests on the evidence cited above and, where noted, on proposals by named experts and institutions.

The problem is real, but size is just one part of it. A province of 127.68 million people is governed from one capital 26, while poverty, out-of-school children and weak local government are national problems 323429. India’s evidence suggests that smaller units can help in some cases but are not a reliable cure 50. Our view is that new provinces should be treated as one tool among several, not a solution in themselves 5049.

1. Fix the third tier first, or at least at the same time. The local governance task force proposed making Article 140-A as specific and enforceable as Article 160 is for the NFC, with fixed, judicially protected terms and direct elections 29. Ishrat Husain has proposed that provincial finance commissions pass at least 30 to 40 per cent of the provincial share to local governments 54. The ECP has proposed barring governments from changing local government laws or boundaries after councils’ terms expire 31. Cheema, Khan and Myerson’s work suggests these reforms are likelier to last if parties contest local elections 41. These steps need no change to provincial boundaries, so they avoid the Article 239(4) lock 14.

2. Use an independent commission with published criteria. Pildat’s Mehboob has proposed a State Reorganisation Commission on India’s model 10, and the PML-N’s own 2019 bill proposed a National Commission for the Creation of New Provinces 20. Triple Frontiers’ view is that such a body should publish its criteria before drawing any map: population, administrative and fiscal viability, geography and distance to services, and evidence of local consent, in line with Dawn’s call for scrutiny of economic viability, administrative capacity and resource distribution 51 and Ahsan Iqbal’s call for an equitable formula 6.

3. Start where consent already exists. The Punjab Assembly backed South Punjab and Bahawalpur provinces unanimously in 2012 16, the PML-N and PTI have both put forward South Punjab plans 2019, and the KP Assembly backed a Hazara province unanimously in December 2025 23. These are the cases where the two-thirds provincial vote required by Article 239(4) looks achievable 14. Sindh’s assembly has rejected division 52. In our assessment, overriding a provincial assembly, whether by amending Article 239(4) or by a national referendum, would risk the kind of conflict the clause was written to prevent 1052.

4. Sequence with NFC reform and protect existing shares. Because the 18th Amendment protects each province’s share from falling under a new award 28, new provinces carved from existing ones would need a formula agreed in advance. Ahsan Iqbal has called for an “equitable formula” 6 and has proposed freezing population at 241.5 million and linking transfers to human development outcomes 28. A new province without a negotiated fiscal settlement would repeat the Fata experience, in which KP’s share for the merged areas was still being reviewed by the NFC in December 2025, more than seven years after the merger 2425.

5. Set fiscal rules and measure results. New administrations should be costed in public before approval, given the IMF programme’s targets 45 and the cost concerns already raised 6. Each new unit should have published baselines for poverty, schooling and service delivery and should be evaluated after five years, so that a pilot such as South Punjab can inform any further change 3234.

A governance model for Pakistan: three-tier federalism with a locked-in local tier

This is Triple Frontiers’ own proposal, building on the five recommendations above.

Local government as the engine of service delivery. Elected councils would have fixed terms that no provincial government could suspend, extending the task force’s call for judicially protected terms 29 to the suspensions described above 30. Large cities would have directly elected mayors heading metropolitan governments, and local elections would be party-based, which Cheema, Khan and Myerson argue gives parties a stake in local democracy 41.

Kerala shows the potential and limits of devolving money: in July 1996 its government decided to earmark 35 to 40 per cent of the state’s annual plan outlay for projects drawn up by local bodies, in what became the People’s Plan Campaign 55. India’s Comptroller and Auditor General later found that 29.68 per cent of plan funds were transferred between 2002-03 and 2005-06 55. A 2002 assessment in the Economic and Political Weekly found that around 90 per cent of local plan funds came untied and that gram sabha checks on beneficiary lists reduced the chance of ineligible people receiving benefits, but also that contractors often did the work in the name of beneficiary committees 56.

In Indonesia, laws passed in 1999 transferred powers, taxes, funds and personnel to the regions from January 2001, and a 2004 law provided for regional heads to be directly elected 57. A World Bank study found no significant effects on human development outcomes four years after districts switched to direct elections, although health spending became more responsive to local needs 58. In our reading, elected local leaders are necessary for better services but not sufficient 5658.

Money follows responsibility. Ishrat Husain’s proposed 30 to 40 per cent floor for provincial finance commission transfers to local governments (recommendation 1) 54 would, on Kerala’s experience, need auditing as well as legislating 55. Local bodies also need taxes of their own. A report for the International Growth Centre found that Punjab collects about 0.05 per cent of its GDP in property taxes, nearly seven times below the average in lower-middle-income countries, and that a provincial department collects it on behalf of local governments 59. Tobias Haque, a World Bank senior economist, said in October 2023 that real estate should yield revenue of 2 per cent of GDP and agriculture 1 per cent, both in provincial jurisdiction 60. Under the 2024 IMF programme, Punjab and KP passed amended agricultural income tax laws, and Sindh’s assembly followed in February 2025 to meet the programme’s requirements 6144.

Some transfers could reward results, building on Ahsan Iqbal’s proposal to link NFC transfers to human development outcomes and reduce the 82 per cent population weight 28. The evidence counsels caution: a World Bank evaluation of a Tanzanian project offering local grants conditional on institutional performance scores estimated its value-added to state capacity at zero, as areas outside it improved comparably 62.

New provinces by commission and consent. Boundary changes would follow recommendations 2 and 3: an independent commission 1020, starting where provincial assemblies have voted in favour 1623, within Article 239(4) 14.

A professional, protected civil service. A study by Musharraf Rasool Cyan and Obed Pasha of 338 elite management posts in Punjab in 2006-2010 found that a change of elected government and the desirability of a post both increased the frequency of transfers 63. Dawn reported in 2021 that field postings of district police officers in Punjab often lasted about six months, against the three-year term set by the Police Order 2002 64. Our model would make minimum tenures for district officials enforceable, require published reasons for early transfers and fill senior local posts on merit 6364.

Continuity over design. Cheema, Khan and Myerson’s finding that civilian governments dismantled or failed to revive each military-era local system 41 suggests that durability matters more than a perfect blueprint. The East Asian case for authoritarian development is narrower than it appears 65. Cristobal Kay of the Institute of Social Studies argued in 2001 that land reform was a major factor in starting industrialisation in Taiwan and South Korea, that both moved into export-oriented industrialisation, and that their bureaucracies were more competent than many in Latin America 65. He also noted that their autocratic governments received major US economic and military aid during the Cold War 65, as Ayub’s and Zia’s governments did, according to Faruqui 3537.

What the model cannot fix. Better local government would not by itself lift investment from 14.3 per cent of GDP 43, deliver the tax-to-GDP increase the IMF programme targets 4445, or clear a power-sector circular debt that Dawn put at Rs1.661 trillion in July 2025 66. Nor would it settle the civil-military balance under which, Faruqui notes, civilian governments have operated 35. Those need national decisions; the model’s claim is narrower, that services improve when money, power and accountability sit at the same level 2949.

What a new provinces or governance model would mean for Pakistan overall

On service delivery, the potential gain is shorter distances to government 749. Aleem Khan has argued that citizens face “long, exhausting, and humiliating journeys” to provincial capitals 7. The risk, in the IPS’s words, is that new provinces “may simply recreate existing administrative weaknesses on a smaller scale” if districts remain powerless 49.

On fiscal federalism, more provinces would mean more claimants on an NFC formula that has not been renegotiated since 2009-10 28. Without new revenue, the result could be smaller shares spread across more administrations 286. On representation, the Senate would grow and its balance would shift, as the 2013 commission’s figures show 17.

On ethnic balance and stability, a consensual split in Punjab or KP carries lower risk than a contested one in Sindh, where the provincial assembly, the ruling party and nationalist groups are opposed 5262. On the economy, the Indian evidence suggests that any growth dividend depends on the state concerned 50. Pakistan’s binding constraints, including low investment 43, a narrow tax base 44 and elite privileges estimated at $17.4 billion 47, would be unchanged by redrawn boundaries alone.

The trade-off, in our view, is between speed and durability. A referendum or a constitutional bypass could move faster 310. A sequence of protected local government, an independent commission, consent-based pilots and an agreed NFC formula would take longer, but rests on the same two-thirds majorities that the 25th Amendment achieved for Fata 24.

Why it matters

The question affects how 241.49 million people are governed and how money is shared among them 2628. As of 1 November 2026, according to Huzaifa Rehman, the government intended to introduce a 28th amendment before the New Year 1; as of 28 October, according to Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, the PPP regarded the debate as closed 2. Because a two-thirds vote in parliament and in the affected provincial assembly is required 14, the outcome depends on whether the federal government and its allies can reach agreement with the PPP and the provinces concerned 1052.

The documents

Responses

Federal government: Huzaifa Rehman, special assistant to the prime minister, said “the proper forums for gauging public opinion are parliament and a referendum” and that the 28th amendment would be introduced before the New Year 1. Minister of State for Law Barrister Aqeel said: “First, all political parties will be taken on board.” 10

PML-N: Rana Sanaullah said in September 2026 that the party had not finalised its position and that “parliamentary decisions will be accepted by all parties” 11. Ahsan Iqbal has proposed 12 to 15 provinces 6. The party submitted a bill for Bahawalpur and South Punjab provinces in 2019 20.

PPP: Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari said: “No one else can decide the fate of this province or this city.” 2 Sindh Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah said the decision would be made by members of the Sindh Assembly, “not businessmen from Lahore” 52. Sindh minister Saeed Ghani said: “There is no benefit to this.” 7

PTI: Chief Whip Amir Dogar said the party would support new provinces where there is a genuine need and that the government should first revive the South Punjab secretariat 10. ARY News reported, citing party sources, that Imran Khan backed new provinces as being in the national interest 67. Sayed Zulfikar Bukhari said: “Foundations must be rock solid before cutting up the country further.” 7

MQM-P: Mustafa Kamal said administrative units are “not against Sindhis; it is for Sindhis” 52. Khalid Maqbool Siddiqui said: “This right of creating provinces in the Constitution is there since the time of Bhutto.” 13

IPP: Abdul Aleem Khan said: “The creation of new provinces can help resolve public issues and improve administrative efficiency.” 8

JUI-F: Senator Kamran Murtaza said: “Those who want new provinces will use us (legislators) for making the desired amendments to the Constitution” 10.

How we reported this

This investigation draws on the text of Article 239 of the Constitution, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics census results, World Bank World Development Indicators, UNDP and World Bank reports as covered by Dawn and other outlets, academic and think-tank papers (IGIDR, IPS, Cheema, Khan and Myerson), and reporting by Dawn, The Express Tribune, The News, Geo News, ARY News, Arab News and Reuters 142636504941. Every source cited was opened.

Several recent reports on the government’s plans rest on unnamed sources, and are attributed as such 39. The growth averages by era are Triple Frontiers’ calculation from World Bank annual data; assigning years to governments, including transition years, is approximate 36. Proposals for a specific number of provinces vary between outlets and officials and are attributed individually 346.

Triple Frontiers excluded claims it could not verify from an opened source, including any text of a 28th amendment draft, official cost estimates for new provinces, outcome data on Telangana and Nigeria’s state creation, and secondary summaries of studies it could not read. The section headed “Triple Frontiers’ assessment” is the publication’s analysis; its recommendations are clearly marked and, where they rely on proposals by Pildat, Ishrat Husain, the local governance task force or the ECP, these are attributed 10542931.

An update on 19 November 2026 added the subsection “A governance model for Pakistan: three-tier federalism with a locked-in local tier”, Triple Frontiers’ own proposal, drawing on an Indian state audit report and an Economic and Political Weekly assessment of Kerala, World Bank working papers on Indonesia and Tanzania, an International Growth Centre report on Punjab’s property tax, peer-reviewed and working-paper research on civil service transfers and East Asian development, and Dawn reporting 5556586259636566.

Sources and references

  1. ArticleARY News, “28th constitutional amendment expected before New Year: PM’s Advisor”, 1 November 2026. Link
  2. ArticleDawn, “Bilawal calls for ‘burying’ debate over new provinces”, 28 October 2026. Link
  3. ArticleARY News, “Govt speeds up groundwork for referendum on new provinces”, 14 November 2026. Link
  4. ArticleDaily Pakistan, “Pakistan’s 12-Province Plan emerges with ‘Nationwide Referendum’ on Table”, 8 November 2026. Link
  5. ArticleArab News Pakistan, “Pakistan interior minister calls for new administrative units to overhaul governance”, 30 July 2026. Link
  6. ArticleThe News, “Ahsan Iqbal proposes 12 to 15 new provinces, asks PM to set up committee for debate”, 4 September 2026. Link
  7. ArticleArab News Pakistan, “Pakistan ruling party silent as two coalition allies back new provinces proposal”, 3 August 2026. Link
  8. ArticleDawn, “Aleem Khan expresses support for Hazara province, calls for new administrative units”, 15 August 2026. Link
  9. ArticleDawn, “New administrative units ‘under serious consideration’”, 15 August 2026. Link
  10. ArticleDawn, “Plan for new provinces faces political minefield”, 10 August 2026. Link
  11. ArticleThe News, “Parliament will decide on creation of new provinces: Sanaullah”, 12 September 2026. Link
  12. ArticleArab News Pakistan, “Pakistan PM aide says any referendum on new provinces needs parliamentary approval”, 13 September 2026. Link
  13. ArticleDawn, “MQM-P leadership says constitutional provision invokes creation of new provinces”, 20 November 2025. Link
  14. Official documentpakistani.org (text of the Constitution), “Constitution of Pakistan, Part XI: Amendment of Constitution (Article 239)”. Link
  15. ArticleDawn, “President gives assent to 27th Amendment after Senate nod”, 14 November 2025. Link
  16. ArticleThe Express Tribune, “Punjab Assembly passes South Punjab, Bahawalpur province resolutions”, 9 May 2012. Link
  17. ArticleDawn, “One-third of Punjab to make new province”, 27 January 2013. Link
  18. ArticleDawn, “Senate passes 24th Constitutional Amendment Bill”, 6 March 2013. Link
  19. ArticleDawn, “Buzdar approves 385 posts for south Punjab secretariat”, 6 June 2020. Link
  20. ArticleDawn, “PML-N submits bill seeking creation of Bahawalpur, South Punjab provinces in NA”, 28 January 2019. Link
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  22. ArticleDawn, “KP Assembly adopts resolution to create Hazara province”, 21 March 2014. Link
  23. ArticleGeo News, “Unanimous KP Assembly resolution demands creation of Hazara province”, 2 December 2025. Link
  24. ArticleDawn, “President approves Fata-KP merger bill”, 1 June 2018. Link
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  26. Official documentPakistan Bureau of Statistics, “Announcement of results of 7th Population and Housing Census 2023”, 5 August 2023. Link
  27. ArticleDawn, “Population surpasses 240m, new census shows”, 6 August 2023. Link
  28. ArticleDawn, “Updating NFC award”, 11 August 2025. Link
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  30. ArticleThe Express Tribune, “Local govt elections in K-P put on hold”, 6 November 2026. Link
  31. ArticleDawn, “ECP says ready to hold LG polls in Punjab, KP, blames last-minute amendments for delays”, 31 July 2026. Link
  32. ArticleDawn, “Poverty surge sparks World Bank warning”, 24 September 2025. Link
  33. ArticleDawn, “Amid global decline, Pakistan ranked among 26 lowest HDI states”, 7 May 2025. Link
  34. ArticleThe Express Tribune, “26m children out of school in Pakistan”, 27 February 2026. Link
  35. ArticleThe Friday Times, “How Has Pakistan’s Economy Performed Since Independence?”, 16 August 2025. Link
  36. ReportWorld Bank, “World Development Indicators: GDP growth (annual %), Pakistan”, 11 November 2026. Link
  37. ReportCenter for Global Development, “Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers”, September 2013. Link
  38. Official documentWAPDA, “Tarbela Dam Project”. Link
  39. Official documentRadio Pakistan, “M-2 motorway anniversary recalls start of Pakistan’s modern highway era”, 26 November 2025. Link
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  41. ReportInternational Growth Centre / LUMS, “Breaking the Countercyclical Pattern of Local Democracy in Pakistan (Cheema, Khan, Myerson)”, May 2010. Link
  42. ReportWorld Bank, “World Development Indicators: GDP per capita (current US$), Pakistan, India, Bangladesh”, 11 November 2026. Link
  43. ReportWorld Bank, “World Development Indicators: gross capital formation (% of GDP)”, 11 November 2026. Link
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  46. ArticleDawn / Reuters, “Pakistan ranked most polluted country in 2025, data shows (Reuters)”, 24 March 2026. Link
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  48. ArticleDawn, “Numbers paint a cruel reality (column)”, 21 April 2021. Link
  49. ReportInstitute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, “Beyond New Provinces: Rethinking Pakistan’s Governance Crisis (IPS Insights)”, 5 August 2026. Link
  50. ReportIndira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, “Does the creation of smaller states lead to higher economic growth? Evidence from state reorganization in India (Vaibhav and Ramaswamy, IGIDR WP-2022-007)”, June 2022. Link
  51. ArticleDawn, “Local governance (editorial)”, 1 August 2026. Link
  52. ArticleThe Express Tribune, “’Sindh is one, shall remain one’: Assembly passes resolution against division of province”, 3 September 2026. Link
  53. ArticleARY News, “New provinces: Khawaja Asif says Sindh Assembly’s stance cannot stop implementation”, 8 September 2026. Link
  54. ArticleDawn, “The provincial power struggle continues”, 22 September 2025. Link
  55. Official documentComptroller and Auditor General of India, “Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Local Self Government Institutions (Kerala) for the year ended 31 March 2006, Chapter I: The Structure and Finances of the Local Self Government Institutions”. Link
  56. ReportEconomic and Political Weekly (copy hosted by Centre for Rural Management, Kottayam), “Five Years of Participatory Planning in Kerala: Rhetoric and Reality (Economic and Political Weekly, 7 December 2002)”, 7 December 2002. Link
  57. ReportKyoto University, Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, “Paper on Indonesia’s decentralisation and local politics, Asian and African Area Studies 5(2)”. Link
  58. ReportWorld Bank (via EconPapers), “Electoral accountability and local government spending in Indonesia (Policy Research Working Paper 6782; Skoufias, Narayan, Dasgupta, Kaiser)”, 1 February 2014. Link
  59. ReportInternational Growth Centre, “Property Tax Utilization and Equity in Punjab: Policy Challenges and Reform Options (Abbas, Ahsan, Amin, Best, Callen, Cheema et al.)”, January 2023. Link
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  61. ArticleDawn, “Sindh Assembly passes bill to tax agriculture income”, 4 February 2025. Link
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  63. ReportCleveland State University EngagedScholarship (journal: Public Administration), “A Symbiosis of Civil Service and Politics in Transfers: The Case of Pakistan’s Management Cadres (Cyan and Pasha, Public Administration 95(4))”, 8 September 2017. Link
  64. ArticleDawn, “Premature transfers a bane of Punjab police”, 3 June 2021. Link
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  67. ArticleARY News, “PTI founder ‘backs’ creation of new provinces in Pakistan”, 12 November 2026. Link

Sources and references are provided for transparency and further reading. Allegations and claims are attributed to their respective sources. Triple Frontiers distinguishes reported allegations from independently established facts.

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New provinces for Pakistan? The push, the constitutional lock and the evidence

Newsroom desk Investigations Desk

Long-form accountability reporting built on documents and records. Stories are researched from official records, court documents, institutional reports and published journalism, with the help of AI research tools, and edited for Triple Frontiers. Every factual claim is linked to its source.

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